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ABSTRACT 
Recent media, political, and military consideration regarding the use of militias 
has been almost totally negative. This conceptual bias against militias is somewhat 
misguided, and can lead to disastrously counterproductive situations. Conceivably, 
militias can play a role in building a functioning state, and can support immediate and 
long-term U.S. and host nation government efforts in these situations.  Stability, Security, 
Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) has become a mainstay of current U.S. strategy, 
but little effort is dedicated to developing options that deal specifically with the inclusion 
of irregular forces outside the control of a central government. This thesis seeks to 
counter the conceptual bias against militia groups, and provides a framework for 
analyzing militias’ potential to assist with the establishment of governance in weak and 
failing states.  Second, it analyzes a series of examples and arrays them along a spectrum 
that can be used to better define militias’ characteristics and intents. The third aim of this 
thesis is to offer a set of strategy options the U.S. might apply in its efforts to deal with 
militias in its nation-building efforts.     
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. PURPOSE.........................................................................................................1 
B. METHODOLOGY ..........................................................................................3 
II. ALL MILITIAS ARE ARMED GROUPS, BUT NOT ALL ARMED 
GROUPS ARE MILITIAS..........................................................................................5 
A. AMERICA'S SCHIZOPHRENIC PERSPECTIVE ON MILITIAS........10 
B. BASIS FOR LEGITIMACY: MILITIAS AND GOVERNANCE ............13 
C. DIFFERENTIATING AMONG MILITIAS ...............................................17 
III. SPECTRUM OF INFLUENCE AND OPTIONS AVAILABLE...........................19 
A. SPECTRUM OF INFLUENCE....................................................................19 
1. Community Based Militias................................................................20 
2. Local Militias......................................................................................23 
3. Regional Militias ................................................................................25 
4. National Militias.................................................................................27 
5. International Militias.........................................................................29 
B. OPTIONS AVAILABLE...............................................................................31 
1. Option One-Limit Interference ........................................................32 
2. Option Two-Divide and Manipulate ................................................33 
3. Option Three-Co-option....................................................................34 
4. Option Four-Direct Engagement......................................................36 
IV. A ROLE FOR MILITIAS IN U.S. NATION-BUILDING EFFORTS??? ...........39 
A. CHALLENGES TO NATION-BUILDING ................................................39 
B. NATION-BUILDING REQUIRES LONG-TERM INVESTMENTS......40 
C. DOMESTIC PRESSURES AFFECT NATION-BUILDING 
EFFORTS .......................................................................................................41 
D. THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT.....44 
E. GOOD INTENTIONS GONE WRONG .....................................................45 
1. DDR and DIAG..................................................................................45 
2. Either Friend or Foe: Security and Stability Does Not Mean 
COIN ...................................................................................................50 
F. CAN MILITIAS PLAY A POSITIVE ROLE IN US NATION-
BUILDING EFFORTS?................................................................................52 
V. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................55 
LIST OF REFERENCES......................................................................................................59 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 ix
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1 Spectrum of Influence......................................................................................31 
Figure 2 Spectrum of Influence and Options Available to the HNG .............................32 
Figure 3 Spectrum of Influence and Options, with Examples .......................................37 





THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
First we would like to thank our wives for their exceptional support and 
encouragement in our efforts.  We are indebted to our thesis advisor, Dr. Anna Simons, 
for her creativity, insight, and guidance.  Dr. Simons proved instrumental in keeping us 
on track and steered us to seek the right questions before attempting to find the answers.  
Colonel (USAF) Brian Greenshields, and Lieutenant Colonel (USA) Jonathon Burns, also 
deserve mention for their invaluable input and assistance.    
We would also like to thank our peers, staff, and faculty of the Department of 
Defense Analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School for providing an environment that 
challenged us to learn.  Finally, our sincerest gratitude goes out to the men of Special 










Struggling states can provide breeding grounds for terrorism, crime, 
trafficking, and humanitarian catastrophes, and can destabilize an entire 
region. Experience shows that managing conflict, particularly internal 
conflict, is not a passing phenomenon. It has become a mainstream part of 
our foreign policy.1  
-Department of State (S/CRS) 
 
A. PURPOSE 
The United States finds itself increasingly involved in the establishment of 
governance in weak and/or failed states. The recent adoption by the Department of 
Defense (DOD) of the concept of Stability Security Transition and Reconstruction 
(SSTR) implies that the U.S. government has accepted a future role in rebuilding 
failed/failing states.2  Future conflicts will almost certainly involve U.S. forces engaging 
various non-state or sub-national actors such as militias. In terms of conventional military 
power, the U.S. is unchallenged on the battlefield. Consequently, the nation’s enemies 
employ asymmetric means to defeat or bypass our conventional superiority. To deal with 
this, the U.S. must adopt new measures for securing the battlespace occupied by these 
new combatants. This calls for new ways to view and engage militias as actors on the 
battlefield. 
Recent media, political, and military attitudes toward the use of militias has been 
almost totally negative.  For instance, nightly news broadcasts portray the Mahdi Army 
as a direct challenge to the fledgling Iraqi government and as a threat to U.S. forces and 
                                                 
1 On its Website, the Department of State Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and 
Stabilization (S/CRS) describes the negative attributes of weak and failing states. 
http://www.state.gov/s/crs/c12936.htm, (accessed 09 February 2007). 
2  Department of Defense Directive Number 3000.05 (dated 28 November 2005), states in paragraph 
4.2: “Stability operations are conducted to help establish order that advances U.S. interests and values.  The 
immediate goal is to provide the local populace with security, restore essential services, and meet 
humanitarian needs.  The long-term goal is to help develop indigenous capacity for securing essential 
services, a viable market economy, and rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society.” 
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have created the universal impression that militias are counterproductive to good order 
and stability.  This perception exists in spite of the spectacular successes of militias from 
the Northern Alliance during the early stages of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in 
2001-02. This conceptual bias against militias is somewhat misguided, and can lead to 
disastrously counterproductive situations. 
There is no reason why some militias cannot play a productive role in building a 
functioning state, and thereby support U.S. and host nation government (HNG) efforts in 
these situations.  With the U.S. military so heavily engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan, few 
forces are left available to conduct large scale reconstruction efforts elsewhere. With an 
All Volunteer Force, the U.S. will never be able to muster the troop numbers required to 
achieve an overwhelming balance in counter-insurgency operations worldwide. 
Therefore, host nation elements must augment the effort. Militias can and have filled this 
role in the past and, even with international pressures to do the contrary, Afghanistan’s 
President Karzai has looked into the pragmatic use of local militias to provide security in 
regions outside his government’s influence.3 Additionally, working with indigenous 
militia forces provides greatly enhanced cultural and geographic knowledge which is 
vital to defeating insurgents, and establishing authority over ungoverned territory. 
However, at the moment, political and military considerations often stigmatize their use.  
This project seeks to counter this conceptual bias, and provides a framework for 
analyzing militias to determine their potential in assisting weak states to establish order.  
First, this thesis will argue for a new definition of militias that takes into account the roles 
they fill for the segments of the population they represent. It is critical to clarify what the 
term “militia” refers to in order to distinguish militias from other armed groups that the 
U.S. could never conceivably be allied with, such as international criminal organizations 
or terrorist organizations. Furthermore, the term militia, as currently perceived by 
Americans, has the negative connotation of an armed group that seeks to challenge or 
remove centralized governance; therefore, to consider use of militias in stability efforts 
                                                 
3 Ron Synovitch, “Afghanistan: Plan to Recruit Militia as Polices Sparks Concern,” Radio Free 
Europe Radio Liberty 15 June 2006; http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/06/5100e619-193f-44c8-
b35f-4e35ef1d228a.html, (accessed 02 March 2007).  
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requires de-stigmatizing or neutralizing the term.  Additionally, refining and better 
defining who “militia” should refer to will better focus analysis, and allow for a clearer 
assessment of policy options.   
Second, this thesis provides a framework for analyzing militias that incorporates 
an assessment of their characteristics, and reasons for existence. Rather than a generic, 
broadly focused approach to militias, this framework treats individual groups as distinct 
and unique organizations. Through a thorough understanding of the environment in 
which a militia operates, political and military leaders can better judge the compatibility 
of the group with U.S. goals, and its ability to support or challenge those goals. This 
framework assesses the position of a given militia along a spectrum designed to capture 
the militia's perceptions of legitimacy as this relates to its ability to influence the 
population.  The spectrum ranges from clan based militias to internationally supported 
movements that directly compete with the state for authority and recognition.  
The third intent of this thesis is to provide strategy options the U.S. might apply 
alongside HNG vis a vis militias.  To determine the potential uses to which a militia can 
be put requires a more nuanced approach, to include developing information about its 
organization, leadership, the social roles it fills and, perhaps most importantly, its 
motivations in relation to those of the central government.  Militias existed prior to 
governments in many regions of the world and recent history has shown that they can 
sometimes develop in the absence of government. History indicates that even groups with 
opposed ideological beliefs can pragmatically align themselves to protect their interests 
from outside interference.  Cooperation is often expedient and groups may well fall back 
into fighting each other upon the removal of the external threat, but the potential for their 
use in supporting U.S. and HNG efforts should not be discounted.  In addition to direct 
confrontation with militia groups, the U.S. should address other options and this thesis 
provides a starting point for the development of future long-term strategies.   
B. METHODOLOGY  
The first chapter of this thesis is dedicated to clarifying what we mean by “militia. 
Through our research and experience, it became clear that no good definition for the term 
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exists, and that the lack of clarity on the issue leads to hasty policies that fail to account 
for the capabilities of local militias. Thus, we propose our own definition. Chapter II 
presents our framework for analyzing militias. The framework assigns militias to a 
geographic category based on their influence among the population and the extent of the 
territory they control.  The intent of this categorization is to describe the capabilities of a 
given militia in order to determine whether or how to engage it. Chapter III discusses the 
notion that militias are a fact of life in many parts of the world and must be treated as 
players on the battlefield. It addresses the potential advantages and disadvantages of 
engaging militias. The final chapter provides some recommendations which revolve 
around four broad options for how the U.S. and HNG should deal with militias.  
The militias described in this thesis represent a range of ideologies, capabilities, 
and interests. We analyzed well over a dozen militias to determine their reasons for 
existence, organization, motivations, and territorial influence. Many of the ideas and 
observations presented in this thesis are drawn from our personal experiences working 
with and against militias during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. 
Finally, many of the concepts addressed here were strengthened through discussions at 
the U.S. Joint Forces Command Winter Joint Operational Environment Conference, held 
in Portsmouth, Virginia in early 2007.  Additionally, valuable input was received from 
personnel at the U.S. Army’s John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School’s 
Directorate of Training and Doctrine.     
After reviewing the available literature on militias, and recent criticisms of U.S. 
operations in the War on Terror, it has become clear to us that lack of understanding 
about militias has hindered progress (especially in Afghanistan and Iraq) and will 
continue to do so. A better understanding of militias, and how to deal with them, may 
limit the costs of war and may also pay huge dividends.  It is for these reasons that the 
U.S. must rethink how it might use militia groups, which first necessitates a review of 
terminology.   
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II. ALL MILITIAS ARE ARMED GROUPS, BUT NOT ALL 
ARMED GROUPS ARE MILITIAS 
First, while militia wars and insurgencies can both be categorized as civil 
wars,  they are not exactly the same. In a militia war, the government 
risks being perceived as just another militia, with no greater legitimacy 
than the other combatants.4 
 
     -Andrew Exum, “Iraq as a Militia War” 
  
Current descriptions of modern and future conflicts involving the U.S. tend to 
mention asymmetry.  The U.S. is viewed as the powerful, but less adept side faced by a 
clever, nimble, and unrestrained enemy.  An unspoken truth in most such analyses is the 
tendency to measure capabilities using Western constructs of warfare.5  Unfortunately, 
current events have demonstrated that our likeliest opponents are to be found among non-
western, non-state actors and “nontraditional” military organizations that do not conform 
to western ideals or practices, to include militia groups.6  Solely by virtue of their lack of 
direct attachment to a recognized nation-state, many armed groups might be labeled 
“non-state actors.” Authors Richard Schultz, Douglas Farah, and Itamara V. Lochard 
further categorize non-state actors into insurgents, terrorists, militias, and organized 
crime groups.7  Just on their own, however, labels like these and the connotations they 
have can prevent policymakers and military leaders from selecting specific courses of 
action.  In theory, it is possible for the U.S. to openly work with organizations publicly 
                                                 
4 Andrew Exum, "Iraq as a Militia War," Policy Watch/Peace Watch, 12 January 2007. 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2551, (accessed 13 March 2007). 
5 See Anna Simons, “Seeing the Enemy (or Not),” Rethinking the Principle of War, Anthony D. 
McIvor (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2005), 322-344. 
6 Andrea Dew and Richard Schultz in their book, Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias: The Warriors of 
Contemporary Combat, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 36.  The authors provide a useful 
definition for non-state actors: “Groups that challenge the authority of states, challenge the rule of law, use 
violence in unconventional, asymmetrical, and indiscriminate operations to achieve their aims, operate 
within and across state boundaries, use covert intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities, and have 
factional schisms that affect their ability to operate effectively.” 
7 Richard Schultz, Douglas Farah and Itamara V. Lochard, Armed Groups: A Tier-One Security 
Priority, INSS Occasional Paper 57, (USAF Academy, Colorado: USAF Institute for National Security 
Studies, 2004). 
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labeled “terrorist” or “criminal” but, realistically, the negative connotations are too great 
to make this likely.  Our premise is that by applying a means of identifying and 
differentiating among armed groups, decision makers can better develop specific policies 
by which to deal with them.  The labels applied to armed groups are but a starting point 
and require additional analysis that could lead to policies that are not automatically 
exclusionary.    
Following U.S. and UN actions in the 1990s right up until the present, the use of 
the term “militia” has become commonplace. Television news reports typically use the 
term “militia” to describe any irregular element not directly attached to a central 
government and apply it indiscriminately to any group in Iraq. The term “militia” is also 
used interchangeably with other labels for armed groups: insurgents, terrorists, 
extremists, and paramilitaries. Yet, such a broad definition is hardly helpful when dealing 
with people motivated by local grievances—issues which militias may address. Such 
broad use of the term associates militias with people who oppose the U.S. and vilifies 
portions of the populace whose actions are not at all criminally intended.  Not all militias 
seek to challenge the authority of even their own government. Often they instead serve to 
deliver local security. In many regions of the world, these local militias existed prior to 
the establishment of the central government and often have equal or greater value and 
legitimacy in locals’ eyes.   
Because definitions often drive perceptions they can affect and influence policy 
choices.  DOD does not have a standardized definition for a militia.  Militias--like 
insurgents, gangs, paramilitary, terrorist, criminal, and guerrilla groups--fall under the 
broad, umbrella definition of “irregular forces.”8 Thus it is possible for an armed group to 
straddle a number of DOD categories; a paramilitary group might just as easily be labeled 
                                                 
8 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Pub 1-02, (Washington 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001; amended through January 2007), 276. 
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a terrorist or guerrilla group.9  This might not seem to pose a problem, but this is a 
predicament for the DOD.  Military commanders seeking to work with a local security 
force will not do so if the group can also be labeled a “terrorist group” or “insurgent 
group,” regardless of the organizations true affiliation towards the HNG.  Also worth 
noting is that the labels typically assigned are done so from the perspective of outsiders.  
The local populace is not always likely to agree with the labels the U.S. uses and instead 
applies its own standards. 
This is why defining militias, though difficult, is crucial for the development of 
strategies to deal with militias.  Authors Shultz, Farah, and Lochard identify the 
difficulties inherent in defining armed groups and present a starting point for the study of 
militias by defining them according to a set of descriptive characteristics:    
A militia in today’s context is a recognizable irregular armed force 
operating within the territory of a weak and/or failing state. The members 
of militias often come from the under classes and tend to be composed of 
young males who are  drawn into this milieu because it gives them access 
to money, resources, power,  and security. Not infrequently they are 
forced to join; in other instances it is seen as an opportunity or a duty. 
Militias can represent specific ethnic, religious, tribal, clan, or other 
communal groups. They may operate under the auspices of a factional 
leader, clan, or ethnic group, or on their own after the break-up of  the 
states’ forces. They may also be in the service of the state, either directly 
or indirectly. Generally, members of militias receive no formal military 
training. Nevertheless, in some cases they are skilled unconventional 
fighters. In other instances they are nothing more than a gang of extremely 
violent thugs that prey on the civilian population.10  
Based on the characteristics presented above, it is possible for an armed group to fit 
multiple categories and be labeled a number of different ways. A street gang might be 
viewed as both a criminal organization and legitimate protector of the populace, 
depending on both who is granting the recognition and the context in which the group 
                                                 
9  Joint Pub 1-02, 400, 538.  The Joint Publication for military terms defines paramilitary forces and 
terrorist groups as follows: “Paramilitary forces — Forces or groups distinct from the regular armed forces 
of any country, but resembling them in organization, equipment, training, or mission. Terrorist group — 
Any number of terrorists who assemble together, have a unifying relationship, or are organized for the 
purpose of committing an act or acts of violence or threatens violence in pursuit of their political, religious, 
or ideological objectives.” 
10 Schultz, et al., 23. 
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exists.  For instance, a gang might be viewed negatively by a particular neighborhood, 
but this perspective might change in the event a greater threat intrudes from outside the 
neighborhood which the gang helps to defend.  In some cases, the external threat might 
actually be the U.S. or HNG forces.   
For the U.S. to address the option of using militias as a means to assist in security 
and stability efforts, it is first necessary to understand that how a group is classified is not 
static, since a group’s roles are dynamic in nature.  Instead, policy options should balance 
our desires with local capabilities and should be realistic enough to properly prioritize 
and categorize potential threats. A group's intent to complement or compete with a 
central government's influence in its territory does not mean it seeks to overthrow or 
remove the government.   
Shultz, Farah, and Lochard's definition of militias provides a baseline to which we 
can add points as we attempt to differentiate militias from other armed groups.  The 
nature of the term militia will always leave room for interpretation, which makes it 
difficult to create an all-encompassing definition, but certain minimal characteristics 
should be present to warrant the use of the label. In order for the U.S. to de-stigmatize 
and neutralize the term, it is necessary to focus on characteristics that could positively or 
negatively affect policymakers’ perceptions.  With that in mind, we believe the following 
characteristics apply: 
1) A militia is capable of using violence as a means of influence and, at its core, 
serves to fill a void in governance not filled by a central authority.  Unlike an insurgent 
group, the “militia” is not driven to remove the host nation government as much as it 
seeks to protect and secure its own interests or autonomy. 
2) Though a street gang might possess some temporary legitimacy, its support 
base is generally small and usually exclusive to those directly considered “members” of 
the gang.  Unlike a gang, a militia possesses a greater degree of legitimacy in the territory 
in which it operates, and it is not primarily a predator or parasite on the state.  Instead, a 
militia is viewed as a competing, legitimate representative of a segment of the populace 
based on religious, tribal, ethnic, ideological, and/or territorial grounds.    
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3) Unlike a surrogate military force, a militia is an irregular force that exists 
outside the direct control of the host nation’s central government or that of another 
competing state.  The militia is not already beholden to the HNG and is not a directly 
controlled proxy force for use by a competing government.   
4) A militia might be permanent or ad hoc in nature, but maintains a sense of 
legitimacy over time in the eyes of its members and those it represents.   
5)  Unlike a criminal organization, a militia may participate in criminal activities 
but does not exist for the sake of conducting criminal acts; sometimes these may be 
necessary to procure the means (weapons, cash) to a more collective end (local security).  
The standard manner in which armed groups are categorized is to classify them 
according to their organizational structure and capabilities compared to those of a 
professional military. We submit that militias may be better judged according to the 
purposes they serve.  First and foremost, a group may be considered a militia if it protects 
its constituents from outside threats. An armed group that serves as a societal defense 
mechanism is likely to be granted legitimacy by those it protects.  It is true that this 
legitimacy might only be temporary, but if it is based on a positive contribution and/or 
the militia achieves the population’s goals this is surely worth noting.  As a central 
authority builds its capacity at the local level and earns credibility, it is possible for it to 
mitigate or undercut the militia’s basis of legitimacy, but to do so may also cost the 
government the public’s support, especially if the population views the militia as “its” 
militia.       
Even by adding characteristics to the list created by Shultz, Farah, and Lochard, it 
is obvious that a standard definition for militias will always leave room for potential 
objections.  This is one reason decision makers should tailor their views to the particular 
group in question whenever possible.  But also, as a leading participant in operations that 
may have to deal with local militias, the U.S. should recognize that some of its biases 
may stem from its own history. 
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A. AMERICA'S SCHIZOPHRENIC PERSPECTIVE ON MILITIAS 
In current U.S. society, the term militia conjures mixed emotions which indirectly 
influence policy decisions. On one hand, Americans romantically conjure up images of 
the “minutemen” from our own Revolutionary War. On the other, we condemn the 
factionalized infighting attributed to militias in many less developed regions. The 
tendency of the U.S. to view all militia groups that are not under the control of the central 
government as a threat ignores the dividends that might be gained by integrating specific 
militia groups into processes aimed at the long-term strengthening of a central authority.  
Unfortunately, the reluctance to recognize private militias is likely engrained in the 
American psyche and is a byproduct of domestic legal interpretations of what constitutes 
a militia.   
Arguments persist in U.S. law regarding what comprises a militia and what 
constitutes its role in modern society.  The term “militia” in the U.S. often evokes images 
of the National Guard, but it legally extends to private organizations that have the right to 
arm themselves as a means of providing protection from perceived threats, both external 
and domestic.  Most Americans are comfortable with the idea of a standing militia that 
falls directly under the control of the central government, but view private militias 
negatively.  Private militias suggest images of extremism and anti-establishment ideals, 
but in actuality, they are protected within the confines of U.S. law.11  While arguments 
persist as to whether the Constitution’s Article 1, Section 8 endorses private militias, the 
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) takes a less judgmental view based on historical  
context.12  The DOJ considers militias to be more than state-established and controlled 
                                                 
11  On its Web site, http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/secondamendment2.htm#2c, the Department of Justice 
presents a Memorandum of Opinion for the Attorney General  entitled “Whether the Second Amendment 
Secures an Individual Right,” dated  24 August 2004.  The memorandum establishes precedence for the 
interpretation of the U.S. Constitution’s definition of what constitutes a “militia.”  The memorandum views 
private militia groups as a legal addition to state-sanctioned national guard organizations (accessed 09 
January 2007). 
12 The U.S. Constitution Online, http://www.usconstitution.net/xconst_A1Sec8.html, provides the 
U.S. Constitution in its entirety.  Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution of the United States of America 
describes the Powers of Congress to include, "To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws 
of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;" (accessed 11 March 2007). 
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National Guards and, by invoking the Constitution's Second Amendment, views them as 
a societal protective mechanism and not solely as an arm of the government,  
The “Militia” as understood at the Founding was not a select group such 
as the National Guard of today. It consisted of all able-bodied male 
citizens. The Second Amendment's preface identifies as a justification for 
the individual right that a  necessary condition for an effective citizen 
militias and for the “free State” that it helps to secure, is a citizenry that is 
privately armed and able to use its private arms.13 
In other words, the federal definition of militia supports citizens’ right to establish private 
organizations to augment state-sponsored security apparatuses (e.g., the military, 
National Guard).  
The U.S. legal definition allows citizens to share in the responsibility of security 
with the state and, in some cases, to protect themselves against the state. However, it also 
has to be recognized that this definition is ethnocentrically shaped by specific historical 
events (e.g. the Revolutionary War).  The U.S. legal recognition of militias may be based 
on U.S. Constitutional “rights,” but that does not mean the U.S. government extends this 
recognition to militias in other regions of the world.  Ironically, when it comes to militias 
in other parts of the world, many policymakers ignore local realities which may not be 
too different from our own in 1776. Elsewhere, as was the case here, the existence of 
militias may be less a government-granted “right” than a fact born of necessity.   
Though debates continue, the U.S. government recognizes the right of individuals 
to organize private militias, as well as their right to conduct operations within applicable 
state and federal laws.  In many cases, private militia groups in the U.S. view themselves 
as protectors of the laws and label themselves as "constitutional militia."14  The U.S. 
government grants legal recognition to private militia groups from a position of 
                                                 
13  Department of Justice presents a Memorandum of Opinion for the Attorney General.    
14  On its Web site, (http://www.constitution.org/mil/mil_us.htm), the "U.S. National Militia 
Directory" provides a state by state list of "constitutional militia" defined as, "...those dedicated to the 
preservation, protection, and defense of the Constitutions for the United States and of their state, open to all 
citizens so dedicated, regardless of race, color, gender, or views on nonconstitutional issues."  When 
reviewing websites of local and state constitutional militias, it is evident that members view their 
organizations as existing to protect the US Constitution in addition to protecting the rights of citizens 
against government abuse (accessed 11 January 2007). 
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monopolized power. Many other governments do not have the capacity to oversee or 
control the establishment and recognition of militia forces.  In many regions, centralized 
authority is non-existent or so weak as to offer no governance to citizens. Also, just 
because the monopolization of power is not centrally located, does not mean it might not 
be found at local levels.  In weak or failed state environments it is militia forces that often 
provide the only means of local security, and their legitimacy is less a function of 
assignment by a centralized authority than a pragmatic, grassroots solution to a void 
government cannot fill. In other words, often external threats motivate the establishment 
or maintenance of local militias and impel people to arm themselves and to engage in 
collective self defense. Ironically, just by virtue of stepping in, never mind applying 
paternalistic measures to disarm and disband local militias, the U.S. inadvertently then 
validates militias’ existence.   
Certainly, in order for the U.S. to work with indigenous groups existing outside 
the direct control of the HNG, it must rethink how it views these groups.  Policymakers 
should at least apply a framework similar to the DOJ's interpretation of the U.S. 
Constitution’s Second Amendment and see if it fits the local situation.  Regardless of 
whether one supports an individual’s right to bear arms, policymakers must be careful not 
to apply a stricter standard for disarmament than that found in the U.S., a country with a 
fraction of the collective security problems found in failing states. Policymakers must 
consider the realities of the situation, accept that armed groups (militias) exist, and not 
rule out their use in assisting stability efforts just on principle. 
Militias are generally viewed as legitimate in the eyes of their members and often 
provide simple measures of governance that a central authority is not capable of 
providing. Even ad hoc armed groups, consisting of locals rallying to defend pasture 
lands from raiders, serve a purpose similar to border security forces in more developed 
nations.  Though untrained and organized dramatically differently than a professional 
military, militias can respond to a threat and are often able to put aside differences for a 
collective purpose: usually protection.  Consequently, what we propose is defining  
“militia” in terms of the security they provide. For purposes of this thesis, we offer the 
following definition:   
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Militia: recognizable armed groups possessing some level of regional 
legitimacy granted by a segment of the population.  Militias might be 
permanent or ad hoc in nature and maintain their legitimacy through the 
ability to offer security and/or social services to members (based on 
ethnic, tribal, geographic, ideological affiliation). 
Central to the DOD definition of irregular forces is a comparison to 
professionally-organized military forces; what makes forces irregular is their organization 
and training. However, other factors can be as important, yet are not taken into account. 
This we believe is a mistake. Why militias exist from the local point of view-why locals 
support them-has to be taken into account.     
B. BASIS FOR LEGITIMACY: MILITIAS AND GOVERNANCE 
The reestablishment of order and promotion of democratic governance are 
important targets for U.S. counter-terrorism strategies. A multitude of academic think 
tanks and government departments have dedicated countless hours to formulating plans 
and strategies that rely on stabilization implemented through the establishment of 
legitimate governance.  The intent is to lessen dangers posed by weak and failing states.  
The absence of some form of authority creates an environment of lawlessness that often 
generates exponentially greater challenges to the U.S. and HNG than is found in areas 
secured by militias.  One way to gauge the purpose militias serve in locals’ eyes is to 
consider legitimacy… using simple governance as a starting point.   
Applying a framework that takes governance into account would enable the U.S. 
to take a more pragmatic look at how a particular militia might assist U.S. efforts in 
strengthening a HNG.  A key theme for the definition of militias used in this thesis is that 
we have to consider legitimacy from locals’ perspective.  In order for the U.S. to address 
which regional militias it might work with, and why, it is first necessary to determine 
whether the militia itself is supported by the local population.   If portions of the populace 
popularly support a militia as a matter of choice and not through coercion, that signals 
they consider the militia a legitimate actor in regional affairs, and we should weigh 
relations with that militia accordingly.  In many cases, the militia possesses greater 
legitimacy in the eyes of the population than the HNG does.  In some circumstances, like 
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Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. might have taken a direct role in the removal of a pre-
existing government, only further exacerbating resentment. For purposes of identifying 
and developing options, it is necessary for the U.S. and HNG to gauge local legitimacy.  
A militia group might serve functions corollary to those of the HNG, but this alone 
should not be sufficient to view it as directly challenging central authority. 
At the same time, should the U.S. or HNG conduct actions to remove or 
marginalize a militia considered legitimate by a constituency, it is important that this only 
be done when the government itself is capable of readily filling voids previously filled by 
the militia.  Care should be taken to identify what roles are served by the militia and to 
what extent the government is able to fill them.  Removal of local militias may well 
introduce instability and should only be done when the HNG possesses both the capacity 
and strength to inherit long-term responsibility for effective local governance.   
In a Foreign Affairs article aimed at encouraging policymakers to support the 
aggressive rebuilding of weak states, Stuart Eizenstat, John Porter, and Jeremy Weinstein 
argue that the U.S. has to be more proactive in implementing measures to strengthen 
governance found in “weak,” “failing,” and “failed” states.  The authors use three basic 
tasks to measure a state’s capacity to provide governance.  The first and most basic task 
is for provision of security through monopolizing the use of force to protect the populace 
from both internal and external threats.  The second is to provide basic services for the 
betterment of society, and education and healthcare are presented as examples.  Lastly, 
legitimacy demands the protection of basic rights and freedoms through the enforcement 
of the rule of law and broad-based participation in the political processes of the state.15  
Based on the three tasks listed above, it is paramount that U.S. planners recognize 
that any shortcomings on the part of a weak government will more than likely need to be 
offset by U.S. assets, a dangerous formula whereby HNGs all too easily develop an over-
reliance on U.S. support.   
                                                 
15 Stuart E. Eizenstat, John E. Porter, Jereme M. Weinstein, Foreign Affairs, “Rebuilding Weak 
States,” January/February 2005, Volume 84, Number 1, 134-146. 
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An inability or unwillingness of a HNG to fulfill roles formerly provided by a 
militia could create greater long-term issues than if the militia is left in place until a later, 
more suitable date.  Whether we approve or not, the reality is that militias serve 
government-like functions in the absence of a central authority and the U.S. typically 
relies on the establishment of a central government as a measure of success. Although the 
U.S. has embraced the idea of nation building, history has shown this to be a daunting 
and often unsuccessful task. A policy of stabilizing and exporting governance based on 
western-style democracy is admirable, but creates some unique challenges that should 
temper policymakers’ eagerness. In an article written for the Stanley Foundation, a 
foundation that focuses on the study of peace and security issues, Anatol Lieven, like 
Eizenstat, Porter, and Weinsten, recommends providing preventative assistance to weak 
and failing states, but caveats that “Direct U.S. military interventions in failing states 
should be extremely rare.”16  Lieven cautions that U.S. military intervention should only 
occur when national interests are threatened by a weak state’s use as a sanctuary for 
attack or “where a genuine case of genocide is occurring.”17  Lieven advises that some 
hard decisions should be made prior to involvement; the most important being the 
understanding and acceptance that a less strict standard of governance should be expected 
in failing states requiring international intervention.  Additionally, once the decision is 
made to participate in improving governance, the international community and the U.S. 
in particular, should understand that it “[Washington] may therefore have no choice, but 
to support local proxies, even when—as was also the case with the anti-Taliban warlords 
in Afghanistan—these are in many ways extremely repulsive.”18 
 
Though the use of proxy forces is often less than preferred, to ignore their 
potential is a greater folly.  Numerous indigenous groups exist prior to or as a result of 
U.S. or HNG actions and deserve analysis for their potential to aid in long-term 
strategies.  Post-conflict operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan have forced 
                                                 
16 Anatol Lieven. “Failing States and US Strategy.” The Stanley Foundation Policy Analysis Brief, 
September 2006. http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/resources.cfm?id=55, 1, (accessed 22 January 2007). 
17 Ibid., 1. 
18 Lieven, 9. 
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policymakers to accept a role in nation-building.  Ongoing military operations following 
the attacks of September 11 offer a glimpse into the likely requirement for the U.S. 
military to be as capable in SSTR efforts as combat.  Military destruction of enemy forces 
will often take a secondary role to reconstruction operations in weak and failing states, 
environments where indigenous groups serve “government-like” roles. The fundamental 
role of a government, as described earlier, is centered on the foundation of security that 
then supports the addition of services and the rule of law.  In environments where 
governance is weak, security is often a responsibility most efficiently maintained at local 
levels by armed groups, referred to in this thesis as militias. 
If one accepts the concept that militias exist and serve government-like roles in 
the absence of a central government, it is easy to then recognize their importance.  Local 
militias will no doubt offer challenges to stability efforts, but may also assist both U.S. 
and HNG efforts to establish levels of security required to facilitate the introduction of 
decent governance. Even in environments that appear hopelessly chaotic and 
unstructured, beneath the surface lie microcosms of structure and order.  Similar to 
individuals dealing with personal challenges, societies possess coping mechanisms that 
facilitate the establishment of stability and security.     
Again, too, in many societies militias pre-date the establishment of a government. 
Councils of elders, respected warriors, tribal or factional leaders often represent forms of 
governance that do not resemble the governments of modern nation-states, but 
nonetheless provide both protection, and services to those whom they consider members.  
In a manner reminiscent of lawyers and arbitrators, many societies rely on councils of 
tribal leaders or sheikhs to oversee disputes between members, and their decisions equate 
to the “rule of law” recognized by modern nations.  It is often these same local leaders 
who mobilize the populace through influence or coercion to engage in self-defense.  
The legitimacy of militias might be questioned when viewed from the outside, but 
it is the local population's perspective that is actually most important.  Pragmatism 
requires that the U.S. accept that militias not only exist, but serve roles that bind them to 
the populace.  The idea of militias and legitimacy may be difficult for many to accept, but  
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the populations that the U.S. and HNG most hope to influence are the very ones that 
directly or indirectly facilitate the maintenance and/or creation of militias. Thus, we seem 
to have little to gain by continuing to view them as a hindrance.     
C. DIFFERENTIATING AMONG MILITIAS     
Current UN-led efforts in Afghanistan highlight the difficulty in dealing with 
militias when they are simplistically labeled legal or illegal, and the overall policy only 
deals in binary either/or’s.  Currently, the idea of incorporating militias into regional 
security plans is almost immediately attacked as “providing a disincentive to 
[disarmament and reintegration].”19 Even with the integration of oversight by HNG 
and/or U.S. forces, any actions that support integration of militias as an alternative to 
disarmament is considered suspect by human rights groups, NGOs and other supporters 
of UN-sponsored DDR.  Yet, we often need the specific capabilities only a local militia 
possesses, especially in cases where the militia is considered more legitimate than the 
HNG.  One reason that militias are viewed in such a simplistic manner stems from the 
tendency of organizations to confuse control with influence… a simple error that has 
major consequences.    
Automatically categorizing armed groups in relation to how much they do or do 
not support the HNG ignores the fact that a militia may pose less of a threat to the 
government than other organizations do (i.e. insurgent cells, criminal organizations). 
Again, militias may be providing the only form of security in the region, and efforts to 
control them might actually serve as a catalyst for rebellion. The default for most HNG 
and external forces is to seek control over groups that may appear to compete with the 
government.  Yet, control is generally based on the ability of a stronger entity to 
command a weaker entity-something the HNG can’t do or there wouldn’t be a militia in 
the first place. Influence is a more fluid process of shaping behaviors or actions to those 
that are desired. It is influence the HNG and U.S. should be seeking.     
                                                 
19 International Crisis Group (ICG), “Elections and Security in Afghanistan,”Asia Briefing, 30 March 
2004, 2.  For purposes of simplicity, ICG uses the term DR in place of the more common DDR as an 
abbreviation for the concepts of disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement, reintegration. 
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Focusing on control at the expense of the ability to influence perpetuates a cycle 
of conflict. Control over militia forces is always preferable, but requires the ability to 
quell resistance and compel concurrence, a capacity that most fledgling governments 
lack.  To balance the desire to control with the ability to influence, it is necessary to first 
accept the existence of militias and to then consider whether and how the militia in 
question might actually facilitate the establishment of governance. Given that HNGs 
often lack resources and the ability to control militias, it seems prudent to address this 
issue more pragmatically than is the practice now.  
Also, it is easy to label indigenous populations as either pro or anti-government, 
but to do so does not take into consideration societal idiosyncrasies.  Societies are 
pluralistic in nature and incorporate divisions based on family, tribes, ethnicities, and so 
on.  Like individuals, militias are often peculiar organizations whose motivations often 
differ as much as their membership.  In many regions of the world, militias, which by 
definition are outside the direct control of a HNG, might represent the only stabilizing 
force available no matter how irregular they seem. The U.S. and/or HNG’s policy, based 
on accomplishing certain goals, can only achieve them by balancing desires with actual 
capabilities. Balancing ideals and expectations with actual abilities allows policymakers 
to identify what options they realistically have.  Currently policymakers must frequently 
base their decisions on uninformed analyses which do not account for the unique 
characteristics possessed by different militias. Unfortunately this leads to the tendency to 
treat militias with too broad a brush and without understanding that no two militias are 
the same.  Therefore, the options they present and the opportunities for dealing with them 
will likewise differ and should be analyzed accordingly—all of which demands a new 
framework for analysis.  
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III. SPECTRUM OF INFLUENCE AND OPTIONS AVAILABLE 
As the HN government weakens and violence increases, people look for 
ways to protect themselves. If the government cannot provide protection, 
people may organize into armed militias to provide that essential service.20 
     -FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency 
 
A. SPECTRUM OF INFLUENCE 
In this chapter we offer a means by which to categorize militias based on their 
geographic reach and influence. Determining their level of influence is accomplished 
through subjective analysis of their objectives or interests, the roles they perform, and the 
size of the geographic area in which they have legitimacy.  
Militias require a territorial base, and for this reason, the spectrum we present is 
based on geographical measures. Militias exist to support or protect the interests of 
certain groups of people; the members of the group (and thus of the militia) share 
common beliefs and cultural ties or backgrounds. Those beliefs or ideals represent facets 
of culture that are unique to the group and essentially tie its members together. Typically, 
people live where they can make a living, where they will be accepted, and where they 
have a support network. Generally, these areas are their homelands, but the geography 
itself does not impose limits on the group. The limits are instead a function of the ties 
among group members.  
Further, since militias have geographic limits, it follows that they do not have 
power everywhere. A militia cannot protect a group that is so scattered that it can’t be 
distinguished from the rest of the population. Where a militia has no coercive capability, 
it cannot count on influencing people. Where a militia is not seen as representative of the  
 
 
                                                 
20 Department of the Army, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 2006, 1-9. 
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population, it is illegitimate. For instance, a Shia militia in Iran has limited influence over 
Shia Muslims in Afghanistan. The militia may claim to represent their interests, but can 
do nothing to impact their lives.  
The spectrum categorizes militias according to their scope of influence. We 
recognize five levels of influence: community, local, regional, national and international. 
A militia’s position along the spectrum need not be static. A militia can change positions 
on the spectrum based on its ability to influence segments of the population. Some factors 
affecting its breadth may have to do with cultural affinities, ethnic, religious or economic 
differences, organizational type, leadership, and the nature of the threat against which the 
militia mobilizes. Also, a militia’s influence may be diminished or enhanced based on 
HNG policies that affect the population from which the militia draws support.  
Another consideration is that as a militia expands, its membership becomes more 
diverse, incorporating people who may not share the same beliefs. This has the effect of 
diluting the core beliefs that initially characterized the militia and gave it its legitimacy. 
This can lead to fracturing of the militia and the formation of splinter groups. Small 
factions of the militia may commit acts in the name of the militia as a whole that actually 
run counter to the original cultural beliefs that led to the formation of the militia in the 
first place. This is an important consideration when deciding whether a militia’s interests 
can be aligned with HNG interests.  
1. Community Based Militias 
A community based militia is one which has influence only over a very limited 
area, such as a village, or a neighborhood within a larger community. The militia is seen 
as a legitimate protective entity only by that community, and generally does not seek 
objectives beyond that community. The community possesses some unique set of values 
that it fears are at risk and so forms a militia for protection. The militia performs its 
designated role within that community in place of an equivalent HNG service. Either the 
community trusts the militia to provide protection more effectively than the HNG, or the 
HNG may be altogether absent. In fact, the community may view the HNG itself as the  
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threat. The existence of a community militia does not imply that the HNG is weak or 
ineffective. It simply means that the community relies more on its own members for 
protection than it does on the HNG.  
The community militia has limited influence outside of the community because it 
has a narrowly based purpose from which it derives its legitimacy. The purpose-or the 
militia’s “cause”-is linked to the protection of a specific set of values that do not have 
widespread appeal. If the values were widespread, and the perceived threat was 
widespread, then the militia would have wider influence and would therefore belong 
elsewhere on the spectrum.  
 
EXAMPLE: Gangs 
Kurt Shaw, in his article “Legitimacy in Colombian Shantytowns,” describes 
gangs as “larger organized armed groups who are hegemonic in the neighborhoods” and 
who enjoy local legitimacy on four grounds: security, economy, social services and 
values.21 Gangs, according to this description, fit our definition of militia. It is when 
gangs become strictly motivated by criminal interests, or exist solely to perpetuate their 
own survival at the expense of their constituents that they fall outside the definition 
proposed here. As this example suggests, it is necessary to analyze a gang’s actions and 
not just its ideology or propaganda, since it will always claim to protect the interests of 
the people.  
Gangs can establish their legitimacy by defeating corrupt or otherwise illegitimate 
elements and establishing order. When a gang imposes order it will be seen to be 
protecting its constituents, and therefore their values. As the gang grows its capacity, it 
may well provide social services. Shaw points out that many gangs in Colombia “offer 
social services to the community in the form of sports groups, women’s and youth 
associations, and bodies that promise to uphold security in the neighborhoods.”22  The 
                                                 
21 Kurt Shaw, Director of the non-governmental organization Shine A Light, presented an essay 
entitled, "Legitimacy in Colombian Shantytowns,” translated by Louise Marsh.  The essay was prepared for 
the International Seminar on urban conflict and possibilities for transformation, Medellin' 5-7 September 
2004.  In his work, Shaw describes how street gangs were becoming legitimized in areas of Latin America.  
The essay can be found at: http://shinealight.org/legitimacy.pdf (accessed 26 March 2007). 
22 Shaw, 7. 
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services provided by the gang are repaid by loyalty from the constituents--so much so 
that gangs in Colombia often enjoy greater legitimacy than the state itself.  
Shaw also indicates that the Colombian Government sometimes sees fit to work 
with gangs. In Altos de Cazuca, according to Shaw, it is not uncommon for police 
organizations to “provide the gang with intelligence and suggest whom they might 
kill.”23  
Perhaps most importantly, the gangs described by Shaw solidify their legitimacy 
by either taking advantage of, or by creating the perception of, an outside threat or 
enemy.24 Frequently, that enemy is the state. The state is portrayed as corrupt and 
oppressive. Politicians are portrayed as thieves who come to villages only to “tell lies and 
search for votes.”25 
The Colombian Government deals with armed groups in a variety of ways. When 
addressing neighborhood or community gangs, it appears that the government is unable 
to supplant the gangs’ legitimacy. The Colombian Government, until recently, has not 
had the power or influence to assert itself in any permanent fashion outside the large 
cities. Most of its political influence in rural areas is through local leaders who are 
essentially autonomous. With no assets or services to offer the local population, the 
government is easily de-legitimized by local gangs that are better able to mobilize assets 
and establish a patronage system, thereby winning the loyalty of locals away from the 
state or from other gangs.  
The significance of community militias lies in their immunity from the state. In 
the case of Colombia, and probably most developing countries, they are physically far 
removed from the state, and therefore attract less attention. Because state reach is so 
limited, community militias have to be self-reliant and their ideology tends to be self-
reinforcing in order to highlight the protective functions they perform. In order to 
displace the influence of community militias, the state must not only overcome the 
                                                 
23 Shaw, 5. 
24 Ibid., 14. 
25 Ibid., 15. 
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perception that it (the state) poses a threat, but it must instill in people a high level of 
trust, which can only come with long periods of sustained effective governance.  
2. Local Militias 
A militia that is local in nature is characterized by having influence over one or 
perhaps a few small villages or towns and surrounding areas, and the majority of the 
people who inhabit those towns. It serves to protect those people and their property. A 
local militia serves as a deterrent to neighboring or outside elements that may seek to 
gain influence within the controlled area. The members of the militia are citizens of that 
particular locality. Because their interests are strictly local, the roles they serve will be 
local in nature. The roles probably will not include much in terms of governance. The 
militia controls a limited area with limited population, limited resources, and limited 
interests. The local militia is distinguished from the community-based militia given the 
former’s broader appeal over a larger area. 
 
EXAMPLE: Kikuyu Home Guards and Kamajors 
Both the Kikuyu Home Guards of the Mau Mau Revolt and the Kamajors of the 
Sierra Leonean Civil War are good examples of local militias. They also represent good 
examples of cooperative efforts between government forces and militias. In both cases, 
the militia was formed to protect local communities from revolutionary guerrillas. Also, 
in both cases the militia played a major part in ultimately defeating the threat towards the 
HNG. 
The Kikuyu Home Guards were initially formed by the Catholic missions in 
Kikuyuland as a protective measure against the Mau Mau.26 In 1953, the Home Guards 
were co-opted by the British Government in Kenya to be part of the security forces. 
Initially, the Home Guards served mostly in defensive roles in villages, and provided 
intelligence to the Kenyan security forces. Later, after being absorbed by the government, 
the Home Guards performed more advanced roles by attacking and cutting off the 
                                                 
26 Wunyabari O. Maloba, Mau Mau and Kenya: An Analysis of a Peasant Revolt, (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1993), 89. 
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guerillas from supportive elements of the population. Initially numbering approximately 
5,000 men, they were armed with only their primitive “bows and arrows, spears, clubs, 
and knives.”27  
When still a Catholic-run militia, the Home Guards worked closely with the 
African Tribal Police, but once the Home Guards were co-opted by the government they 
became a surrogate force. At this point, their numbers swelled, and they received better 
equipment. Unfortunately, the members of the Kikuyu Guard, as it came to be called, 
developed a reputation for committing the same sort of atrocities as their Mau Mau 
enemies.  Nevertheless, in absorbing the Home Guards, the government was essentially 
acknowledging that the insurgency could most effectively be defeated through the people. 
While the government committed eleven infantry battalions, the Kikuyu Guards 
eventually numbered 25,000 men, and were responsible for 42% of the Mau Mau 
casualties in the conflict.28 
The Kikuyu Home Guards never progressed to the point where they provided any 
measurable service other than security in their areas. This is probably due to two reasons. 
First, there weren’t very many of them initially. Second, after being co-opted, they were 
employed in small elements dispersed over a large area. Employed this way, they could 
prevent the influx of Mau Mau into local villages to some degree, but could do little else.  
Before the Kikuyu Guards were co-opted by the government, they could only be 
considered a local militia. They were intended for local protection, and were never 
capable of coordinated efforts over a large area. They could not be considered a regional 
militia in this analysis. They did, however, provide an obstacle to the continued growth of 
Mau Mau influence at the local level, and provided a high level of access and influence 
for the government throughout most of Kikuyuland.  
The genesis of the Kamajors in Sierra Leone was somewhat different from the 
Catholic recruitment of the Kikuyu Home Guards. The Kamajors are mystic, traditional 
                                                 
27 Fred Majdalany, State of Emergency: The Full Story of the Mau Mau, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 
1963), 121. 
28 Ibid., 221. 
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hunters or woodsmen in Mende culture. They were a somewhat obscure element of the 
Mende tribe until they arose to defend their villages against the Revolutionary United 
Front (RUF) during the Sierra Leonean Civil War (1991-2002). The Kamajors were the 
largest and best organized faction of the Civil Defense Forces which were closely aligned 
with the Sierra Leone Peoples’ Party (SLPP). They initially emerged around the towns of 
Bo and Kenema in the southern and eastern sections of the country.29 
The Kamajors succeeded in protecting the local population (initially in the south 
and later across most of the rest of the country as well) from the RUF and its atrocities. 
Armed with primitive weapons and shotguns, their intimate knowledge of the terrain and 
intense local support enabled them to engage small RUF patrols with great success. 
Eventually, the Kamajors were co-opted by the government, allied with the private 
security firm Executive Outcomes, and unleashed with amazing effectiveness on the 
RUF, almost pushing the RUF out of the country. Elements of the Kamajor militia were 
used to secure voting sites for the national elections in 1996.30 Today, the Kamajors still 
exist in a much diminished form, and though their existence was always considered 
unconstitutional in Sierra Leone, they served a noble purpose during the civil war.  
The Kamajors began their service in the civil war as a strictly local defensive 
element. They were loyal to tribal and village chiefs, as well as to their Kamajor chain of 
command. Protection, defeat of the RUF, and return of the displaced to their homes were 
the major reasons for the existence of the Kamajors. Initially, their operations against the 
RUF produced mixed results, but after being co-opted by the government, and teaming 
up with EO, the Kamajors were wildly successful in fighting the RUF.  
3. Regional Militias  
If a militia can exert influence over a recognized region (a geographic area with 
widely known or understood boundaries, characterized by some unique set of features-
geological, ethnic, political, etc), or has aspirations and capacity to govern or control a 
                                                 
29 Patrick Muana, “The Kamajoi Militia: Civil War, Internal Displacement, and the Politics of 
Counterinsurgency,” Africa Development XXII, nos 3 & 4, 1997, 83. 
30 Ibid., 97. 
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region, then it should be considered regional.  It may, for instance, seek regional 
autonomy. It may well be more capable than the government at providing some non-
security related service in its area. Once a militia can influence an area that is 
traditionally referred to or accepted as a region by its citizens then it ceases to be local, 
and should be considered regional. 
 
EXAMPLE: Amal 
Amal is the military arm of the Movement of the Dispossessed (Harakat al 
Mahrumin), founded in 1974 to protect the Shia (mostly Palestinian) population of 
southern Lebanon.31 During the 1980s, Amal gained tremendous influence within 
Lebanon, becoming the major Shia interest group in the country. In the wake of two 
Israeli invasions, Amal provided services for the Shia population that flooded into the 
suburbs of Beirut and southern Lebanon. It became very closely linked to the Council of 
the South, an actual government agency responsible for development in southern 
Lebanon. The head of the Council of the South was initially Dr. Hussayn Kana’an, a 
member of Amal. Kana’an used the council to rebuild schools and hospitals, replace 
teachers, repair roads, and provide assistance for needy families.32 Amal also elected its 
own parliamentary representatives from the south. 
While Amal became a very popular and strong militia, its influence has faded in 
relation to that of Hizballah. According to Judith Harik, Amal did not possess the 
administrative capacity to provide services in Southern Beirut, where nearly half a 
million Shia came to live. Unfortunately, because the Lebanese government was slow to 
institute reconstruction in that area, Amal could not divert government services to its 
constituents. After a series of clashes with Hizballah, Amal was eventually pushed out of 
southern Beirut.  Consequently, its influence was relegated to southern Lebanon.  
 
                                                 
31 Judith Harik, “The Public and Social Services of the Lebanese Militias,” Center for Lebanese 
Studies, Oxford:  Papers on Lebanon, 1994, 12. 
32 Ibid., 20. 
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Today, Amal still exists, although in a much diminished form from its peak 
strength in the mid-80s. Even so, an Amal fighter was among the first to die fighting 
Israeli forces during Israel’s brief occupation of southern Lebanon in the summer of 
2006.33 
4. National Militias 
A national militia is one that has influence over such a broad segment of the 
population and controls such great territory that it can influence social and political 
affairs at the national level. It can compete with the HNG on roughly equal footing for 
influence over the population. The militia’s constituent group considers itself 
representative of the nation.  It may well control factions within the HNG, may seek 
autonomy for its people, and/or may elicit support from outside the country. In other 
words, the group no longer seeks protection or defense only for itself. It now seeks to 
influence the affairs of the state. At this point, the militia can no longer be ignored by the 
HNG. Some measures must be taken to engage the militia in order for the HNG to sustain 
its legitimacy and influence and minimize that of the militia.  
 
EXAMPLE: Junbesh-i-Milli and Abdul Rashid Dostum 
Junbesh-i-Milli (National Islamic Movement) is the political party of Abdul 
Rashid Dostum, the Uzbek Northern Alliance warlord who until recently was dominant 
in the northern region of Afghanistan.34 Junbesh is a political party whose public goals 
are to protect minorities and establish a federalist government in Afghanistan.35 It is more  
 
                                                 
33 This point was introduced by Andrew Exum, a featured speaker at a conference on militias hosted 
by the U.S. Joint Forces Command, Portsmouth, Virginia, 29 January-02 February 2007.  For additional 
information regarding the Israel-Hizballah battles waged in southern Lebanon during the summer of 2006, 
see Exum’s work: Hizballah at War: A Military Assessment, Washington DC, Washington Institute for 
Near East Peace, 2006. 
34 Dostum’s influence has waned since the establishment of the Afghan government, and the 
promotion of Atta Mohammad, Dostum’s primary rival for influence in the north, as a full General in the 
Afghan National Army. 
35 On its Web page, “Insurgency and Terrorism,” 
http://www8.janes.com/search/documentview.do?docId=/content1/janesdata/binder/jwit, Jane’s Online 
provides an overview of numerous organizations labeled as an insurgent or terrorist group (accessed 02 
May 2007). 
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likely, however, that the party exists to support Dostum’s aims for increased autonomy 
for northern Afghanistan, and thus greater power over resources for the Uzbek population 
in that region.  
Junbesh also has its own powerful, well equipped and experienced militia which 
played a major role in the Northern Alliance’s efforts to resist the Taliban until 1997 and, 
in conjunction with U.S. Special Forces, ousted the Taliban from northern Afghanistan in 
2001. The militia has historically received financial and material support from 
Uzbekistan and Russia, presumably as a hedge against Taliban encroachment on its 
borders.36  Despite Dostum’s appointment to various positions within the government, 
and the party’s support for the government, the militia retains its arms and competes with 
the government, and with Jamiat-i-Islami, for influence in the north.  
Dostum’s participation in the government is aimed at gaining greater autonomy 
for himself and his forces within the five or six provinces where he has influence.37 For 
Dostum, a stronger central government means less influence, power, and wealth for 
himself and his followers. Junbesh controls much of the commerce that flows through 
Afghanistan, including the lucrative opium trade, and collects taxes on all of the goods 
coming into the country from Afghanistan’s northern neighbors. This is very profitable 
for Junbesh and naturally it wants to maintain its control over this commerce.  Junbesh’s 
militia now is less concerned with self-protection (which was its primary concern during 
the reign of the Taliban) than with sustaining regional power and influence for which it 
has to fight on the national political stage. 
Currently, it makes little sense for the Afghan government to pursue Junbesh’s 
disarmament too hastily.  Dostum’s nominal loyalty to Hamid Karzai assures some 
measure of control in the north, and amounts to one less enemy Karzai has to deal with. 
                                                 
36 On its Web page, “Insurgency and Terrorism,” 
http://www8.janes.com/search/documentview.do?docId=/content1/janesdata/binder/jwit, Jane’s Online 
provides an overview of numerous organizations labeled as an insurgent or terrorist group (accessed 02 
May 2007). 
37 For more information on warlords, Giustozzi, Antonio. “The Debate of Warlordism: The 
Importance of Military Legitimacy.” Crisis States Discussion Papers. London: Crisis States Programme, 
2005, provides an exceptional analysis of warlords, to include, typology and roles they play.  Additional 
information on Abdul Rashid Dostum can be found in Ben Hwang’s master’s thesis, “Understanding 
Warlordism,” (MS thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007).   
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5. International Militias 
A militia is international if its interests and influence span international borders. 
An international militia has its main constituency located in its territorial homeland, but it 
also conducts operations in other countries on behalf of perceived constituents there. It 
can provide and administer services to its people on a level equal to that of a state. It may 
even be considered a state as it seeks recognition from the international community. 
 
EXAMPLE: Hizballah 
Hizballah is probably the most widely known militia group. In fact, its status as a 
militia is debatable because of its sophistication and broad influence. It represents the 
farthest extreme along the spectrum and, with its effective organization, sophisticated 
methods, international influence, and lofty ambitions is a virtual state within a state. 
Some people call it a terrorist group; some refer to it as a political party with a military 
wing. Many Lebanese look to Hizballah as the de facto government.  
Hizballah was formed in the early 1980s in response to Israel’s invasion of 
Lebanon in 1982. It then consisted exclusively of Shia Muslims who were dedicated to 
fighting Israel and liberating Jerusalem. As the organization grew, it became deeply 
involved in Lebanese politics, and formed its own political wing. Today, the organization 
is so powerful and influential that almost no political decision is made in Lebanon 
without some influence from Hizballah.  
Hizballah’s main goal is to fight and destroy Israel.38 Its interests are no longer 
strictly defense of a homeland. Its interests now involve the destruction of another 
country--Israel, and justify this as a defensive act. It also seeks the liberation of territory 
outside of its normal homeland. Further, Hizballah serves as an agent of the Iranian 
theocracy. It receives money, equipment, and arguably some training from the Iranian 
government, and presumably then carries out some operations in return. Hizballah has 
also executed numerous operations against countries other than Lebanon or Israel. 
                                                 
38 Hizballah initially pursued the establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon similar to that of Iran. 
Hizballah withdrew from that position after the Taif Accords in order to maintain its authority to attack 
Israel. 
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Hizballah agents bombed the Jewish Center in Buenos Aires in 1994 and truck-bombed 
the U.S. Marine Corps barracks in Beirut in 1983 and the US Embassy the following 
year.  
Hizballah enjoys a romantic image at least among the Shia population in 
Lebanon. It is treated as a defense mechanism against Israeli aggression. It is also 
perceived, at least by the Shia population, as more legitimate than the Lebanese 
government. Hizballah excels at providing services to the population. It is this capacity to 
provide services that allowed it to usurp Amal’s dominance in the Dahiya.39 “Backed by 
millions of Iranian financial and material assistance, Hezbollah embarked on the 
construction of schools, hospitals, and charitable relief centers.”40  Its ability to do this in 
place of the Lebanese government contributes to the legitimacy of the organization, and 
discredits the Lebanese government.  
Hizballah is organized into political and military wings. Its military wing is well 
known to the West, and has become an effective force in fighting guerrilla style 
campaigns. Its mitigated success in the summer 2006 war with Israel increased its 
credibility immensely. The political wing, however, also grants Hizballah legitimacy 
within the government and among disinterested parties within the population. Political 
participation is evidence that Hizballah recognizes what it must do to ensure the 
protection of its interests and goals. Merely continuing its resistance to Israel will not 
guarantee the attainment of its goals. When Hizballah was guaranteed its autonomy after 
the Taif Accord, it became a player on equal terms with the Lebanese government. While 
it had to sacrifice or postpone one of its founding pillars (that of establishing an Islamic 
state in Lebanon), it guaranteed its continued existence on the world stage. Through 
continued backing from Iran and Syria, and through continued political participation, 
Hizballah may eventually even achieve its goal of establishing an Islamic state through 
legitimate means.  
                                                 
39 Harik, 22. 
40 Bryan R. Early, “Larger than a Party, Yet Smaller than a State: Locating Hezbollah’s Place within 
Lebanon’s State and Society,” World Affairs, Winter 2006; 168; 3, 120. 
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Without question, Hizballah is an international actor. It has international backing, 
international goals, and has executed operations in foreign countries. It provides services 
roughly equivalent to those of the Lebanese government, and enjoys greater legitimacy 
among the Shia population than the government. Therefore, it must not be dealt with as if 
it is merely a terrorist group. The Lebanese government lacks the capacity to confront 
Hizballah militarily. It must engage Hizballah in some other fashion to erode its 





Figure 1 Spectrum of Influence. 
 
B. OPTIONS AVAILABLE 
Prior to developing courses of action to deal with militias, the U.S. should 
consider its long-term goals as well as constraints and limitations.  The capacity of the 
HN will ultimately decide the feasibility of one option over another.  The options 
presented below are in no way all-inclusive and can be integrated in combination with 
one another.  Our premise is that U.S. policymakers need a method by which to decide 
whether to work with or against a specific group. Being able to fit militias along the 
“spectrum of influence,” should help determine this, along with taking into account other 
particularities, to include the militia group’s human rights record, involvement in 
criminal activities, etc.   
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Figure 2 Spectrum of Influence and Options Available to the HNG 
 
1. Option One-Limit Interference  
The first option is to limit interference with militia groups. This option is suitable 
for situations where the U.S.’s immediate interests are low, the HNG has limited capacity 
to exert coercive authority, and local militias demonstrate that they are capable of 
governing their own people in an acceptable manner.  This particular option might be 
especially preferable when militia groups are incapable of projecting violence and are 
more interested in immediate protection of their population and resources.  By limiting 
interference and using positive incentives to encourage responsible internal security, the 
U.S./HNG can use the militia as a stop-gap prior to the phased introduction of HN 
governance.        
Initial U.S.-led efforts in Operation Restore Hope (09 December 1992- 04 May 
1993) sought to end a Somali famine resulting from factional fighting.  The U.S. 
recognized the lack of a Somali government and prioritized its efforts to accomplish 
immediate goals. The U.S. focused on providing humanitarian assistance and not “taking 
sides among the several Somali factions and on avoiding confrontation and long-term 
animosity, which would have interfered with the achievement of their goals [famine 
OPTIONS 
 
Limit Interference   Divide & Manipulate         Co-option              Direct Engagement 
Divide & Manipulate  Co-Option                         Direct Engagement 
Co-option   Direct Engagement 
Direct Engagement 
 
*As a militia gains influence, its capacity to challenge the HNG also increases. The ability of a militia to challenge 
the HNG generally limits the options available to the HNG. Additionally, the HNG must consider its own 
capabilities to support the selection of a particular option. By default, the U.S. assumes responsibility for 
shortcomings possessed by the HNG. 
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relief] and increased the possibility of casualties.”41  The U.S. understood the need to 
work with warlords and to include them in any long-term efforts to promote governance.  
Upon taking the lead from the U.S., the UN strove for a more conformational approach.  
The UN placed greater emphasis on disarmament at the expense of stability, imposed its 
views of governance on the Somali people, and marginalized many of the warlords.  
Many marginalized warlords, to include the infamous Farah Aideed, then took offense at 
the new strategies enacted by the UN and responded with violence.  
Ultimately, the UN’s efforts to disarm the Somali factions were initiated 
prematurely, without appreciation of secondary effects.  The pragmatic approach taken 
by the U.S., led by Ambassador Robert Oakley, seemed to offer a better alternative than 
forced confrontation.  Nation-building requires patience and the option of limited 
interference provides this.       
2. Option Two-Divide and Manipulate  
The second option is for the U.S./HNG to pursue a strategy of promoting 
divisions within the militia groups. A weak HNG, assisted by the U.S., might utilize this 
option as a means to buy time to strengthen a fledgling government.  This option involves 
exploiting fissures between factions as a means to weaken the power of the group as a 
whole and lessen its potential to threaten the HNG.  Militias are often composed of 
different groups that are not always permanently aligned.  Rivalries are often temporarily 
overlooked in order to deal with immediate external threats and when the cohesion-
building external pressures are removed, the differences re-surface.  When possible, the 
U.S./HNG might overtly or covertly exploit frictions present within a group as a means to 
                                                 
41 John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on 
Peacemaking and Peacekeeping. (Washington D.C.: United State Institute of Peace Press, 1995), 51.  This 
book provides a detailed account of US efforts in Somalia and how many US planners, to include Robert 
Oakley, President Bush’s special envoy, recognized the importance of obtaining local support for 
government-building efforts.  Though well-intentioned, any efforts to impose governance should only be 
attempted with the understanding that the locals possess the ability to disagree, often through the use of 
violence.   
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prevent a combined, synergistic relationship from forming.42  This option, combined with 
co-option, can be an effective method by which to force groups to enter into relations 
with the HNG and to counter the potential of their rivals to do the same. 
The British policy of “divide and rule” used in India, as well as Central Asia, 
proved especially efficient in preventing unification among different groups, thereby 
lessening the risk they posed to British rule.  Through the use of “divide and rule,” the 
British were able to take advantage of frictions that existed between different religious 
and ethnic groups.  Though often viewed negatively, British efforts did prove especially 
effective as a means to prevent India from revolting and it is argued that the British did 
not create, but only “made use of dissension that already existed.”43    
3. Option Three-Co-option  
The third option entails the co-option of militia groups into the activities of the 
legitimately recognized government. This option assumes the HNG possesses sufficient 
influence and the capacity to enlist a militia on its side.  This option seeks to incorporate 
militias as stakeholders in the affairs and the ultimate success of the HNG, but it also 
creates the potential for serious political repercussions if the militia pursues selfish aims 
or assumes greater influence than the state.  Co-option cannot be used if the U.S./HNG 
lacks the capability to punish or coerce.  The intent is to absorb militias into the HNG as 
a means of transferring members’ loyalty to the HNG and not the other way around.  It is 
important to recognize that co-option does not automatically require absorbing militias 
into the HNG, but ties long-term dividends to their working with and not against the 
HNG.   
An example of the simple use of co-option would be as follows: a HNG presents a 
militia leader with humanitarian assistance material to distribute in his region.  The HNG 
officially allows the militia to oversee distribution, therefore granting greater legitimacy 
                                                 
42 For more on this topic, Joseph S. Peterson’s thesis, “Exploiting Tribal Networks through Conflict” 
(MS thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2006), presents the need for U.S. leadership to develop and 
implement strategies that include “manipulating tribal fractures and rivalries” in ungoverned regions. 
43 Robert Aura Smith, Divided India, (New York: Whittlesey House, 1947), 38l, 
http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=3843062 (accessed 26 April 2007). 
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to the militia.  However, the HNG actions do not come without strings attached.  The 
HNG requires the militia group to allow U.S./HNG observers to monitor distribution and, 
through the use of information operations, disseminates to the populace the ultimate 
source of the assistance.  Conceivably, armaments might also be given the militia.  
Security assistance, coupled with humanitarian aid, might prove just the right 
combination of incentives to gain loyalty and trust for the HNG.   The goal is long-term 
dilution of loyalties to the militia by slowly redirecting people’s reliance from the militia 
group to the HNG.  Unfortunately, this option of supplying arms and legitimacy is often 
used prematurely by governments without giving thought to negative secondary effects.  
If done haphazardly, it is quite possible for a HNG to actually increase the threat posed 
by some militia groups.    
British counterinsurgent efforts in Oman during the early 1970s demonstrate how 
loyalty towards a HNG requires the investment of time and resources.  British forces 
battling Marxist rebels in remote regions of southern Yemen co-opted local tribesman 
into supporting the HNG.  Local firqats (forces), organized on a tribal basis, were granted 
responsibility for the security of assigned areas.  Though the firqats were considered 
difficult to work with and not always loyal to the HNG, “they became an effective 
territorial home guard, driving a wedge between insurgents and [the] people.”44  Prior to 
their use by British and Omani forces, the firqats were required to pledge loyalty to the 
HNG.  Through the use of firqats working in conjunction with their British advisors, 
counterinsurgent operations were extremely effective; however, the loyalty of the firqats 
was earned by making them stakeholders in their own region's future.   
Through the implementation of civic action and, especially with the construction 
of water wells, the British-led efforts got many rebels to defect and join the firqats and 
the HNG.  When one rebel was asked why he switched loyalties and joined a 
government-sponsored firqat, he pointed to demonstrated investments by the HNG as a  
 
                                                 
44 Ian F. W. Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies: Guerrillas and Their 
Opponents since 1750, (New York: Routledge, 2001), 228, 
http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=107424586 (accessed 24 April 2007). 
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rationale for support, “You would not have any firqats unless the people supported them 
and you would only have that support if the rumors of progress and development I have 
heard are true.”45      
4. Option Four-Direct Engagement   
The fourth option is for the U.S./HNG to directly confront and/or engage the 
militia group in order to establish power over it. This option is suitable for dealing with 
militias that can provide services comparable to or greater than those of the central 
government, and that directly challenge the central government for influence over the 
population.  In a fashion similar to co-option, direct engagement might include political 
inclusion, but can also involve direct military confrontation when warranted.  Applying 
this option assumes the HNG has the influence, political will, and coercive means to 
either compete with the militia militarily, or can endure the inevitable compromise that 
comes with its inclusion in the political process. If inclusion involves compromise to a 
degree that is unacceptable to the HNG or its support base, then coercive measures may 
be appropriate.  The dangers in integrating factional leaders into the government before 
the HNG is capable of ensuring compliance can lead to long-term struggles.  We see this 
in the current Iraqi government’s struggles with political groups that have their own 
militias, and in the direct engagements between coalition forces with militias loyal to 
Moqtada al-Sadr. Fortunately, HNG efforts to absorb militia leaders have been slightly 
more effective in Afghanistan.   
Afghan President Hamid Karzai is in the unenviable position of having to live by 
the Sun-tzu adage, “keep your friends close, and your enemies closer.”  Through 
appointing many militia leaders to the central government, President Karzai creates 
stakeholders in the future of his government.  Militia leaders, such as Ismail Kahn, Abdul 
Rashid Dostam, Atta Mohammad, and others, have been assigned roles in President 
Karzai's administration in order to marginalize their power.  Though self-interest no 
doubt remains a motivator for their joining the central government, President Karzai's 
                                                 
45 J. Paul De B. Taillon, The Evolution of Special Forces in Counter-Terrorism: The British and 
American Experiences, (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001), 34, 
http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=107161673 (accessed 02 May 2007). 
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efforts allow key militia leaders to be moved away from their regional power bases.  
Smaller militias remain throughout Afghanistan, but the ability of the largest regional 
leaders to muster unified support in their areas of influence has been somewhat diluted.  
Problems and threats to the Afghan government created by the inclusion of warlord-
politicians persist, but Karzai's strategy appears to be successful in buying time for his 
administration by reducing the potential of some warlords to agitate regional revolt.46 
 
 
Figure 3 Spectrum of Influence and Options, with Examples 
                                                 
46 Kenneth Katzman, "Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy," Congressional 
Research Service Report for Congress, 26 April 2007, 11. 
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IV. A ROLE FOR MILITIAS IN U.S. NATION-BUILDING 
EFFORTS???  
The army is still weak and the police are worse. Until the government can 
provide security, no one will feel secure enough to turn over their 
weapons. It’s very frustrating.47 
    - Shuhei Ogawa (Japan’s UN-Afghan DDR liaison) 
 
A. CHALLENGES TO NATION-BUILDING 
Nation-building, formerly a mission avoided by the military, is now a central facet 
of U.S. policy.  The Department of Defense emphasizes the establishment of governance 
through its Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) strategy.  DOD 
Directive 3000.05 promotes the concept of SSTR and tempers the U.S. military’s focus 
on the destruction of enemy forces with the more difficult task of “winning the peace.”   
Stability operations are conducted to help establish order that advances U.S. interests and 
values. The immediate goal often is to provide the local populace with security, restore 
essential services, and meet humanitarian needs. The long-term goal is to help develop 
indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, 
democratic institutions, and a robust civil society.48 
The UN is the organization with the greatest experience in nation-building, 
measured both in successes and failures.  The UN has identified three “security gaps” that 
hinder its efforts to nation-build.  These include an inability to deploy adequate forces for 
immediate security, incapacity to enforce security for the long-term, and an inability to 
adequately establish indigenous governmental capacities to assume responsibilities of 
                                                 
47 David Zucchino.  “Democracy in the Balance,” The Los Angeles Times, 18 November 2006. 
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-ministers18nov18,0,2181551,full.story (accessed 12 
April 2007). 
48 Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, 28 November 2005, paragraph 4.2. 
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security.49  The gaps identified by the UN are by no means isolated to multinational 
efforts, but affect U.S. operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq and will likely remain 
challenges to any future nation-building endeavors. In addition to experiencing 
challenges posed by these security gaps, the U.S. shares an additional challenge with the 
UN: how to control local armed groups.     
Differentiating among militia groups by recognizing the local roles they serve in 
relation to the challenges they pose to a developing HNG could go a long way to helping 
calculate how to redress security gaps.  It is easy to label indigenous populations either 
pro or anti-government, but to do so glosses over and ignores potential splits within 
communities. It could be that families, tribes, or ethnicities only come together in the face 
of an external threat, but otherwise these groups would not remain either unified or 
necessarily permanently pro or anti-government. When confronted by a threat, most 
militia groups will seek relations with or against the HNG based on what is in their best 
interests.  In dealing with militia groups, both the U.S. and HNG should assume 
allegiances are based on self-serving motivations.  When working with militia groups, it 
is always important to remember that even within these groups, loyalties are often 
temporary and require steady reinforcement, both positive and negative.  
Before considering the use of militias to facilitate U.S. nation-building efforts, it 
is necessary to appreciate two major challenges that affect U.S. operations. One, a 
domestically-driven constraint, is the difficulty faced by the U.S. in conducting 
operations of long duration.  The second, driven by indigenous factors, is the side effects 
created by the introduction of U.S. forces into environments that require nation-building.   
B. NATION-BUILDING REQUIRES LONG-TERM INVESTMENTS 
All three “gaps” identified by the UN appear to plague U.S. efforts in both Iraq 
(OIF) and Afghanistan (OEF). Accusations persist that the U.S. did not provide forces 
adequate to prevent lawlessness and violence.  Additional accusations target the lack of 
foresight in predicting and resourcing the efforts for long term success.  The initial 
                                                 
49 Nina M. Serafino, “Policing in Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Problems and 
Proposed Solutions.” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 30 March 2004, 8-9. 
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combat victories of OEF and OIF led many to believe that large numbers of forces were 
no longer needed and effective use of technology could be a viable substitute.  Initially 
lauded as an incredible success, “The Rumsfeld doctrine emphasizing high technology, 
special operations units, and sheer brainpower to defeat future foes” presented critical 
weaknesses for operations of lengthy duration.50 It turns out that what is really needed is 
the quick establishment of security if there is to be a transition to long-term stability 
efforts, and this in turn requires a large investment of resources, both in personnel and 
material. 
C. DOMESTIC PRESSURES AFFECT NATION-BUILDING EFFORTS 
Recent experiences in Iraq have demonstrated that efforts to conserve initial 
resources led to the need for even greater investments over time.  With worsening 
conditions, the tendency is to then keep increasing the number of personnel to reestablish 
levels of security previously lost, as can be seen in the recent “surge” in U.S. forces sent 
to reestablish previous levels of security in and around Baghdad.  The increase in U.S. 
forces sent to Iraq has been accompanied by requests for additional forces to deal with a 
resurgent Taliban in Afghanistan.51 In both countries, greater troop numbers are being 
sought to improve the security situation. Unfortunately, this is posing a major strain on 
the U.S. military. Andrew Krepinevich concluded in a 2006 study “that the Army cannot 
sustain the pace of troop deployments to Iraq long enough to break the  
back of the insurgency.”52  A year after Krepinevich's report, there has been no respite for 
the military and forces in both theaters are not only growing in numbers, but are facing 
extended tours of duty.53    
                                                 
50 Michael E. O'Hanlon,  "Operation Iraqi Freedom and the Future of the US Military (Iraq Memo 
#17)." Brookings Institute, 19 June 2003. www.brookings.edu/views/op-ed/ohanlon/20030619.htm 
(accessed 16 February 2007). 
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As politicians debate the effectiveness of surging more forces into both theaters, 
some signs of optimism are cautiously offered. While walking down the streets of Ar 
Ramadi, a notorious hotbed of insurgent activities, the commander of U.S. efforts in Iraq, 
General David Petraues, recently pointed out that greater force numbers and tactics are 
working, “Once the people know we are going to be around, then all kinds of things start 
to happen.” 54  It is yet to be seen whether U.S. strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan will 
succeed, but General Petraues' strategy, like the security gaps identified by the UN, 
requires a long-term investment, one the U.S. public appears to be losing interest in 
supporting.  A recent USA Today/Gallup poll conducted in March 23-25, 2007 reported 
that nearly 60% of those questioned believed a timetable should be set to remove most 
U.S. troops from Iraq by September 2008.55 It is fair to believe that war strategies should 
not be based upon polling data. However, reality demonstrates the difficulties faced by 
politicians and military leaders in maintaining public support of long-term operations that 
use large numbers of forces, both of which are required for successful nation-building. 
Nation-building not only entails an initial heavy investment of resources and 
troops to stabilize and secure an environment, but it takes time to rebuild and consolidate 
HNG capacities.  The task of building a HNG capable of assuming the burdens of 
governance in a timeframe that does not see the erosion of public support is daunting.  
Current and future U.S. nation-building efforts will more than likely remain centered on 
developing western-style governments, an almost overwhelming task, especially 
considering how few historical successes there have been.  Though nation-building does 
not always require fighting against an insurgency, efforts to establish governance in 
environments with insurgent threats offers us a way to gauge likely security 
requirements.    
RAND mathematician James T. Quinlivan has studied British counter-insurgent 
efforts in both Northern Ireland and Malaya, as well as international stability operations 
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in Kosovo.  Quinlivan calculates that it takes from one to four security personnel 
(military and/or police) per every thousand inhabitants in peaceful environments, to as 
many as twenty per thousand in more troubled regions. Additionally, Quinlivan further 
explains that successful stability efforts are long-term in nature and require the rotation of 
security forces at an optimal ratio of five personnel at the ready (not deployed) for every 
one member serving in a security role (deployed).  Based on his calculations, Quinlivan 
describes how Iraq alone would require 500,000 service members and a standing force of 
roughly 2.5 million; the numbers for Afghanistan are even more staggering when its 
much larger population is taken into consideration. 56  
 
 
Figure 4 Quinlivan’s depiction of force rations required for nation-building.57 
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Mathematical calculations by themselves are not an adequate predictor of the 
success or failure of strategies, but they do serve as indicators of constraints that must be 
considered by policy-makers prior to initiating stability and security operations.  Political 
and military leaders face a paradox that challenges them to weigh the chances of success 
against the need to pace their efforts. Larger numbers of forces might increase the 
likelihood of success, but the greater investment in financial, military and even political 
capital tends to shorten the length of time allocated for success.  As evident in both 
current and past military endeavors, domestic support tends to diminish the longer 
violence ensues.  With greater losses in both manpower and finances, populations tend to 
grow restless and question the merit of deploying forces to deal with issues outside their 
homeland.  On the other hand, deploying too small a force might delay or even lessen the 
chance of victory, but could provide policy-makers a greater period of time in which to 
implement long-term strategies.  Regardless of the strategy chosen, policymakers and 
military leaders are put in the unenviable position of demonstrating and measuring 
success against the resources invested--time and manpower.      
D. THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT 
Accepting the premise that nation-building requires adequate forces to guarantee 
security, it is also critical that policymakers realize that shortcomings in a HNG’s 
capacity to fulfill government responsibilities will be inherited by the U.S.  An 
unfortunate side effect often created by increased U.S. involvement is the development of 
an over-reliance on U.S. forces and resources by a HNG.  A major consequence of U.S.-
led efforts in nation-building is the tendency for the efforts to become more American 
and less host nation.  With a greater U.S. presence, there begins to be an appearance of 
occupation and this leads the local populace to question the nature and legitimacy of the 
HNG.  Different local groups, with local influence and power at stake, can mobilize their 
population against U.S. efforts and those of the HNG.  In an effort to quell resistance or 
challenges, additional forces are then introduced and the population is further alienated.  
As we can see in case after case, external forces, however well-intentioned, become a 
catalyst for armed resistance against what is deemed to be an external threat.  Increases in 
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violence lead to greater force requirements, leading to greater resistance… a vicious and 
unfortunate cycle that often plagues nation-building and one with which the U.S. has 
become familiar. 
The U.S., like the UN, has accepted the premise that the best means of nation-
building is to remove the capacity of groups that threaten or might threaten the HNG.  
However, in doing so, an external actor is often challenging the local authorities best able 
to maintain a baseline of security in the absence of a HNG presence. Though often 
necessary, the removal of armed groups should not be a default strategy.  Actions against 
armed groups should be based on their actual challenges to governance, and not just their 
potential to do so.  The desire for action by the U.S. and HNG should likewise be 
balanced against their own actual capacity to maintain their efforts over the long-term 
and to follow through.  Also, when U.S. and HNG efforts include policies that threaten 
the very identity of some local groups this can actually produce greater resistance.  As 
mentioned earlier, external threats are often the greatest catalyst for unifying groups that 
feel they must protect their way of life.   
The strategy of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) is one 
example of how external actors can both pose such a threat and oversimplify a complex 
issue.  The U.S. and UN both view DDR as an immediate means to bolster legitimacy for 
a HNG, but often do so at the expense of alienating local groups.    
E. GOOD INTENTIONS GONE WRONG  
1. DDR and DIAG 
A major drawback of U.S. and UN nation-building efforts is to immediately apply 
DDR as a default methodology for achieving stability. Instead of implementing a more 
modest “oil spot strategy,” which could introduce DDR to areas where the HNG is most 
capable of maintaining long-term security responsibilities, the actions are often projected 
 46
to areas where the potential dangers are greatest and HNG capabilities are least robust.58  
The haphazard effort to project DDR too soon creates environments where the 
introduction of anything externally generated, especially in the form of disarmament 
efforts themselves, fuels resentment and violence against the government.  Additionally, 
DDR without a strong HNG creates openings for even greater challenges to the HNG 
when more developed and cohesive militias respond to greater government involvement 
in their regions.  In these cases, security gaps will be filled by insurgent groups that exist 
as a direct reflection of government incapacity.      
The basis of DDR is sound.  The HNG, supported by external aid, removes excess 
weaponry, dismantles illegal armed groups, and then offers alternative means of 
livelihood.  In order for the aims of DDR to be met, however, the HNG must possess the 
means to enforce DDR initiatives, both positively and negatively. The HNG must possess 
the capacity to compel adherence to disarmament, and demobilization efforts and the 
prospects of alternative employment must be maintained for the duration required to 
change the micro-economies that exist in weak and failing states.  Adding to the 
difficulties of DDR is the requirement that the HNG take over security that the disbanded 
armed groups provided. Often using a combination of coercion and benevolence, local 
militias provide protection and dispute-settlement capabilities beyond the reach of the 
HNG.  Significantly, it is in the regions outside actual government influence where DDR 
is promoted and it is in those same remote regions where the HNG faces the greatest 
difficulties in establishing legitimacy.   
The success of DDR in areas beyond the reach of the HNG depends on the 
willingness of the population to share or divert its loyalties to an external entity, one that 
offers them few benefits. Again, the concept of DDR is well intentioned, but assumes that 
the local population is willing or capable of granting legitimacy to a HNG at the expense 
of its own safety.  For instance, DDR efforts in Afghanistan implemented under the UN’s     
Afghanistan’s New Beginnings Program (ANBP): 
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… had two main goals: to break the historic patriarchal chain of command 
existing between the former commanders and their men and to provide the 
demobilized personnel with the ability to become economically 
independent - the ultimate objective being to reinforce the authority of the  
government. However, DDR was never mandated to disarm the population 
per se or provide direct employment but to assist AMF military personnel 
to transition from military into civilian occupations. 59 
From ANBP’s start in April 2003 through its reported successful completion in 
June 2006, “DDR supported the disarmament of 63,380 former officers and soldiers of 
the Afghan Military Forces (AMF) as well as the decommissioning of 259 AMF units.”60   
In addition to its demobilization and disarmament efforts, ANBP also claims to have 
reintegrated 53,415 former AMF members, to include hundreds of local commanders and 
even Ministry of Defense Generals. 61      
With DDR completed, the ANBP transitioned its efforts to supporting the 
Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG), a danger the Afghan government 
identified as an immediate threat to its ability to govern:   
The disarmament and demobilization element of the DDR process is now 
complete and we must tackle the disbandment of non-statutory and illegal 
armed groups. These illegal armed groups, and there are far too many, 
pose a threat to good governance generally, and more specifically to the 
extension of the rule of law and the writ of the central government into the 
provinces.62 
Though DDR was officially concluded by the ANBP in 2006, “remnants of the AMF as 
well as groups which had never joined the AMF were declared illegal” (Afghan 
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Presidential decree 50, July 24, 2004).63   The ANBP’s transition from DDR to DIAG in 
an effort to quell violence actually fed, and continues, a cycle of violence since the 
concept of a centralized government runs counter to with the societal norms of many 
localized communities, and this is most evident in the efforts to disarm. The Afghan law 
on Fire Weapons, Ammunitions and Explosive Materials (FWAEM) states, “The 
government has sovereignty over those fire weapons, ammunitions and explosive 
material which are existing [sic] in this country. Other persons and authorities without 
legal permission have no right to produce, import, export, gain, use and keep them.”64  
In the effort to promote stability, the Afghan government’s attempt to register and 
confiscate weapons will likely backfire.  In many remote regions of the country, armed 
groups existed before the central government’s establishment and individuals view 
weapons ownership as a personal right. Implementation of both DDR and DIAG, though 
well-intentioned, has focused governmental efforts toward eradicating possible threats 
before developing a capacity to fill whatever positive roles the armed groups might have 
played in protecting locals from brigands, crime, and any other threats to their security. 
By starting with the disarmament of former military members of the Afghan Military 
Forces (AMF), who were not integrated into the newly formed national army, the 
government created a security gap that it could not fill; furthermore, in doing so, it short-
circuited its ability to influence the actions of those it had demobilized. Upon 
implementation of the DIAG program, the HNG vilified members of many of the very 
same AMF groups that had lent it important support previously.  In a short period of time, 
many localized militias throughout Afghanistan went from being government-sanctioned 
military forces to outlaws, a policy shift that continues to haunt efforts to legitimize 
government across the country. In fact, many of these local groups now view the Afghan 
central government as worse than just an impotent organization; they consider it a direct 
threat to their very existence.  
The UN and Afghan government have ostracized the local populace by 
designating all armed groups outside HNG control to be illegal.  According to the Afghan 




government, “An illegal armed group is understood to be a group of five or more armed 
individuals operating outside the law, drawing its cohesion from (a) loyalty to the 
commander, (b) receipt of material benefits, (c) impunity enjoyed by members, (d) shared 
ethnic or social background.”65   Once so many armed groups in Afghanistan have been 
stigmatized as illegal, the ability to develop any positive influence by the U.S. and 
Afghan government is lost.  The very populations the government seeks assistance from 
in its efforts to eradicate insurgent threats now view the government in a less than 
favorable manner.  Though many positive contributions have been made by DDR efforts, 
they are truly far from “successful.”  The reality on the ground paints a different picture, 
with many areas of the country drifting back to being controlled by insurgent forces. The 
Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission claimed in August 2006 that the Taliban 
insurgency has “psychological and de facto military control of nearly half of 
Afghanistan.”66   
The deteriorated security situation in Afghanistan should not be blamed solely on 
DDR efforts, but some blame is warranted. Successful nation-building requires the 
population to identify with the HNG and believe that it is capable of fulfilling the tasks of 
basic governance.  Legitimacy of a government is not given, but is earned through 
demonstrated performance of actions that the population believes enhances or protects its 
well-being.  Even strong, functioning governments find it necessary to maintain the 
loyalty of their populations in this way or they risk having to rely on coercion. Like the 
governments they sometimes challenge, leaders of militias are required to deliver benefits 
to their constituents as well, and cannot rely on coercion alone to maintain loyalty; 
furthermore, to do so jeopardizes their legitimacy and makes them susceptible to  
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removal.  The promotion of DDR in regions where the HNG is incapable of improving 
security and economic opportunities invites exploitation by militias that can, and often 
do, fill the security gaps thereby created.     
An obvious, but unfortunate side-effect of well-intentioned DDR efforts has been 
to replace some semblance of security with none.  At the time of ANBP’s DDR program, 
the Afghan government lacked the coercive capacity to monopolize the use of violence 
and often relied on AMF/militia groups to fill this role.  Though not always effective to 
the degree desired, AMF organizations (often with U.S. assistance) did grant the central 
government some space to influence and control actions in many regions beyond its 
immediate reach.       
2. Either Friend or Foe: Security and Stability Does Not Mean COIN  
When viewed through the lens of COIN (counterinsurgency), all players are 
potential insurgents. Following the violent actions of 9/11, the U.S. GWOT strategy has 
been aggressive toward both terrorist organizations and the sanctuaries that provide them 
support.  Ongoing efforts in both Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated the military’s 
exceptional prowess at rooting out and destroying threats, but we’ve also come to better 
appreciate the difficult nature of security operations and how unintentional consequences 
might derail strategy.  In both countries, the U.S. military finds itself involved in 
complicated struggles with insurgent forces that use violence with the intent to destabilize 
and ultimately overthrow the U.S.-supported HNG.  The high levels of attention paid to 
the military’s combat actions in Iraq and Afghanistan have led to the unintended 
consequence that most planners now view stability operations as synonymous with 
COIN.   
Based on the need to identify threats to the U.S. and HNG, military efforts 
generally categorize the populace according to the insurgent threat they pose.  Insurgents 
seek to remove the government; those who are pro-government seek to protect it; and 
those outside of these two categories make up the group the other two seek to influence. 
But again, reality paints a much more complicated picture. Generally, the government 
and its survival or removal is a far more remote concern for the local populace than  
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protecting their way of life.  Viewing the populace in a simplified manner may assist 
COIN policies, but does little to address underlying issues oriented towards immediate 
local defense and security.   
In COIN operations, the government is dedicated toward establishing its 
legitimacy in the eyes of the populace; this requires a stable and secure environment.  The 
new COIN manual, FM 3-24 (December 2006), defines militias as “extragovernmental 
arbiters of the populace’s physical security” and categorizes them as threats to host nation 
governments.67  While recognizing the role militias play in providing security, the US 
military describes this role in a manner that makes them appear to be diametrically 
opposed to the goals of the HNG.  Based on DOD’s purely negative categorization of 
militias, a prescription for removal is then given:  
Militias sometimes use the promise of security, or the threat to remove it, 
to maintain control of cities and towns. Such militias may be sectarian or 
based on political parties. The HNG government must recognize and 
remove the threat to sovereignty and legitimacy posed by 
extragovernmental organizations of this type.68 
U.S. COIN efforts focus on the removal of the threat posed by armed groups that 
offer potential challenges to the HNG.  But again, as with the UN, U.S. efforts to disarm 
create gaps in security that the HNG is incapable of filling. This ultimately leads to 
lawlessness and its accompanying violence.  In these tumultuous environments, U.S. 
forces take over stability and security with unfortunate side effects.  The HNG often 
willingly grants the U.S. the lead on its own COIN efforts, which further diminishes the 
HNG’s legitimacy in the eyes of the populace.  The population either becomes 
increasingly dependent on U.S. or outside aid rather than the services of the HNG, or 
worse, the perception of the U.S. as an occupying force serves to motivate dissension 
against the HNG.   
While the actions of local irregular forces (militia groups) and the HNG do 
invariably affect each other, they should not be viewed as zero sum.  Activities that 
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benefit one side do not always come at the expense of the other.  In a COIN environment, 
a secure population might in fact hinder insurgent activities and this would serve as a 
force multiplying factor for both the U.S. and HNG.  Also, though local militia groups 
might not support the HNG, their neutrality might be preferable to hostility and, in the 
long-term, stability might provide a more conducive environment for the introduction of 
improved governance.  Indeed, it might not only be possible but prudent to incorporate 
some militias as a prophylaxis against actual insurgent forces.  Sometimes the best 
strategy for countering insurgents is to lessen the HNG’s need for external forces and to 
rely more on local, non-governmental security mechanisms--a strategy that might be 
gaining acceptance in Iraq.   
In a March 2006 Washington Post article, John Ward Anderson describes how 
tribal leaders in the restive region of Anbar province formed militias as a means to 
combat insurgents.  One tribal sheikh is quoted as saying that U.S. military officers 
helped militias “with all kinds of financial support.” A U.S. military spokesman in 
Baghdad, Lt. Col. Barry Johnson, denied that American forces were funding the militias 
and exclaimed, “All military activity is conducted through the legitimate structures of 
Iraqi government and security forces. We [U.S.] are working hard to ensure these 
structures function properly, and funding a program such as this would only undermine 
that process.” 69  Though the U.S. denies aiding the establishment of militias, perhaps the 
U.S. and HNG would be better off by being more receptive to working with militias or, at 
a minimum, not turning them into enemies.   
F. CAN MILITIAS PLAY A POSITIVE ROLE IN US NATION-BUILDING 
EFFORTS? 
Within regions of weak and failed states, even the most chaotic and violent ones, 
there exist small pockets of stability.  Where a central government is incapable or 
unwilling to provide security and social services, other regulating mechanisms will fill 
the void.  The dangers posed by militia forces are real, but the dangers in removing them 
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might create even greater difficulties for the U.S. and a HNG.  The bottom line is militias 
exist because a void, real or perceived, exists in the capacity of the government to protect 
local populations.  Any desires to remove militias should be tempered with a close look at 
the government-like roles they play and whether the HNG has the capacity to assume 
those duties.  Many experts believe that it is unconscionable to even consider using 
militias in nation-building efforts.  Many believe any options that include using militia 
forces do so in direct contradiction of DDR efforts and will ultimately lead to armed 
groups outside the control of the HNG being granted too much power.70    
There are many considerations when it comes to condoning the establishment and 
maintenance of armed groups outside the control of the HNG. A government that has to 
rely on militias advertises its own military weakness and causes citizens to question its 
legitimacy. Also, how does it then prevent the proliferation of militias, each vying for 
power or control over its specific region or population?  Ultimately, the establishment of 
governance takes time and the lack of security dramatically shortens the timeframe a 
government has in which to earn legitimacy. But, to view militias in a monolithic and 
purely negative manner does not allow planners to realize that militias, like individuals, 
vary dramatically.  Some militias do engage in activities that should preclude the U.S. or 
HNG from ever viewing them as anything but a threat. However, it is just as reasonable 
to recognize that some militias offer useful capabilities that can facilitate long-term 
nation-building efforts.  The U.S. and HNG should not expect to work with all militia 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Imposing U.S. models on indigenous security forces rarely succeeds. We 
must find ways to do things the local way.71 
-USMC Countering Irregular Threats 
 
The increased U.S. emphasis on SSTR operations demonstrates policymakers’ 
recognition of the current and future dangers presented by lawless and ungoverned 
regions.  The absence or incapacity of a government to provide stability and security to 
its populace invites unwanted competition from groups that seek to fill gaps in local 
security.  Armed groups existing outside of the recognized political process often fill the 
roles normally played by a government and in doing so, gain legitimacy from segments 
of the population. These locally legitimized armed groups may not be recognized by the 
U.S. or HNG, but these “militias” are accepted as representatives of the populace they 
directly or indirectly serve.   
The complex nature of operations in environments containing militias, coupled 
with the long-duration required for nation-building, require compromises from all parties.  
For instance, the militias, like their HNG competition, are forced to balance motivations 
with capabilities. Militias often find it necessary to curtail their challenges to the HNG in 
order to prevent overwhelming responses that will ultimately lead to their demise.  
Additionally, militias are beholden to fulfill the functions they have assumed in the place 
of a central government.  Legitimacy requires responsibility.  Coercion alone will not 
ensure support by the local populace. Meanwhile, militias, like individuals, are often 
idiosyncratic, with motivations as varied as the individuals they represent. This is the 
reason all militias should not be treated the same. Rather, each should be viewed in 
relation to its environment and the population it serves.  
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The relationship between militias and governments is a complicated one and 
defies singular solutions.  Whatever option the U.S. or HNG selects should be tied to 
long-term goals, while implementation of any policy should only be made after careful 
consideration of points introduced in this thesis. 
• Militia groups differ from one another.  Strategies should include efforts to 
differentiate among armed groups and to develop specific actions for each. 
• The issue of who grants legitimacy should be addressed.  Local militia 
groups are often viewed legitimately by a segment of the population even 
if not by the U.S. and HNG. 
• Militia groups are granted legitimacy by local populations because they 
serve roles the HNG is incapable of.  Before implementing any efforts to 
remove a militia group, the U.S. and HNG should possess the ability to fill 
the roles previously held by the militia groups. This is especially important 
in matters concerning security and social programs. 
• Any shortcomings by the HNG in its capacity to deal with militia groups 
will inevitably fall to the U.S.  The greater the responsibilities the U.S. 
assumes, the greater the likelihood of the appearance of occupation and 
threat.   
• When the U.S. and HNG are considered an external threat, the likelier this 
is to fuel a cycle of violence.  As one side increases its efforts, the other 
side will respond accordingly. 
• The desire to dismantle militia groups should not override the need for a 
degree of stability in order to effectively (re)introduce governance.  
Overemphasis on immediate control of militia groups should not override 
the long-term need to maintain influence with the population.  
In many regions of the world, militias beyond the direct control of a HNG might 
represent the only stabilizing force available and could help cement better future relations 
between the government and segments of the population. It is impossible to imagine the 
U.S. condoning favorable relations with certain armed groups, like Al Qaeda (AQ), but 
then, AQ and many others armed groups do not meet the criteria we use to define a 
militia group.   At the same time, it is equally difficult to imagine why a weak HNG 
bolstered by U.S. assistance would want to confront all groups without considering its 




accomplishing predetermined goals balanced against capabilities. Some connectivity to 
militia groups as a means of maintaining influence should be fostered or, at the very least, 
given careful consideration.  
In sum, ongoing efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrate the need for the U.S. 
to carefully examine all available options for facilitating long-term nation-building.  The 
establishment of governance requires large investments of resources and time, both of 
which the American public has hesitated to support indefinitely.  With increases in 
domestic and international pressure, the U.S. and the governments of Afghanistan and 
Iraq have been forced to rethink how they view militias.  Government officials publicly 
condemn militia groups while pragmatically or hypocritically accepting their existence.  
Strategies to deal with militia groups should not be reactionary, but should be made prior 
to the deployment of troops or resources.  Instead of developing strategies to work with 
militia groups only after exhausting all efforts to quell them, the U.S. should develop 
premeditated strategies that seek to decrease frictions between weak HNGs and militia 
groups.   
Though no magic solution has been found for dealing with the issue of militias in 
nation-building, a valuable lesson might be drawn from recent U.S. endeavors in both 
Afghanistan and Iraq.  The U.S. can no longer rely on strategies that treat local militias as 
antagonists.  Militia groups should be analyzed individually and their legitimacy in the 
eyes of the locals should not be discounted simply because the DOD has traditionally 
defined militias as threats.  The use of some militia groups, to include co-opting them, as 
a short-term means toward a long-term end could prove invaluable in facilitating the 
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